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WHAT'S So SPECIAL ABOUT SPECIAL RIGHTS?
KAREN ENGLE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In The Common Law,' Oliver Wendell Holmes put forth what Rob-
ert Gordon has considered a "positivist formulation of a legal right":2
Every right is a consequence attached by the law to one or more facts
which the law defines, and wherever the law gives any one special
rights not shared by the body of the people, it does so on the ground
that certain special facts, not true of the rest of the world, are true of
him. When a group of facts thus singled out by the law exists in the
case of a given person, he is said to be entitled to the corresponding
rights; meaning, thereby, that the law helps him to constrain his
neighbors, or some of them, in a way in which it would not, if all the
facts in question were not true of him .... There are always two
things to be asked: first, what are the facts which make up the group
in question; and then, what are the consequences attached by the law
to that group. The former generally offers the only difficulties.'
In this article, I use Holmes's definition of a special right to frame
the debate between gay rights proponents and gay rights opponents over
the issue whether gay rights are special rights. I do so by exploring the
arguments made on behalf and against the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (ENDA),' a federal bill prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation, as well as two judicial opinions that consider
gay rights to be special rights.
* Professor of Law, University of Utah. I am grateful to the University of Denver College of
Law and the Denver University Law Review, especially to Nancy Ehrenreich, Martha Ertman, and
Karla Robertson, for hosting and organizing a terrific forum for exchange of ideas. I greatly
appreciate comments on the written and oral presentation of this article from participants of the
symposium, particularly Patricia Cain, Jane Schacter and Kendall Thomas, as well as from Daniel
Greenwood, Morton Horwitz, Duncan Kennedy, Gary Peller, Ileana Porras and Mary Westby. Thanks
to Chris Griffin, Barbara McFarlane and Svitlana Tokarenko for their research assistance, and to The
University of Iowa College of Law and The University of Utah College of Law for research funds.
1. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).
2. Robert Gordon, Holmes' Common Law as Legal and Social Science, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV.
719, 723 (1982).
3. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 214 (emphasis added); see also Gordon, supra note 2, at 723-24
(quoting and addressing this portion of Holmes's The Common Law).
4. ENDA was first introduced in 1994 as S. 2288, 103d Cong. (1994) and H.R. 4636, 103d
Cong. (1994). It was subsequently introduced in 1996 as S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996) and H.R.
1863, 104th Cong. (1996) and again in 1997 as S. 869, 105th Cong. (1997).
5. The two opinions are Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) and the majority opinion in Equality Foundation, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,
128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
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Through this exploration, I make three arguments. First, opponents
and proponents of gay rights use the term "special rights" in very differ-
ent senses. As a result, ENDA advocates, by arguing that ENDA does
not grant homosexuals special rights, are not responsive to the special
rights critics. Second, not only do ENDA advocates fail to address their
opponents' concerns, they unwittingly buy into a very conservative view
about civil rights. That is, they suggest that economic efficiency should
guide lawmaking, and that affirmative action or other "preferences" are
negative. Third, ENDA advocates perpetuate and even accentuate the
assumption made by critics that special rights for gay men and lesbians,
as well as for other groups, are bad. I question this assumption by calling
for a gay rights advocacy that responds to the critics by arguing for spe-
cial rights, because-in Holmes's sense of the term-the facts call for
them.
In many ways, Holmes's two questions highlight the distinctions
between the ways that special rights are used by opponents and propo-
nents of gay rights. The first inquiry, "what are the facts which make up
the group in question,"6 is largely focused on by proponents. For them,
the group is homosexuals and the argument is that there is nothing spe-
cial about the facts that require special treatment. If anything, the facts-
as they see them-tend to lean toward the opposite result. In Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion in Romer v. Evans,7 for example, homosexu-
als are defined by the conduct that they engage in, conduct that may con-
stitutionally be criminalized and therefore should not be protected.8 Gay
rights advocates, in contrast, rarely talk about the facts that make up the
group. Rather, they tend to focus on the legal consequences attached to
the determination of whether the group is protected. Justice Kennedy's
failure to mention Bowers v. Hardwick in his majority opinion in Evans,
is, as Janet Halley has discussed, an example of the avoidance of the
factual discussion.'" Further, ENDA advocates seem more concerned
with the legal consequences of the bill's passage (no affirmative action,
for example) than the discrimination that calls for a remedy.
In this article, I call for gay rights advocates to focus on the first in-
quiry, by turning to the facts that make up the group "homosexual." The
article proceeds as follows. Part II outlines four distinct meanings of spe-
cial rights deployed by opponents of gay rights. These meanings are
gleaned from judicial opinions and legislative debate and testimony sur-
rounding ENDA. Part III examines legislative arguments in support of
ENDA to demonstrate that gay rights advocates are largely responding to
6. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 214.
7. 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 636.
9. 478 U.S 186 (1986).
10. See Janet E. Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 429, 429-30 (1997). For
further discussion of Halley's argument, see infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
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a different notion of special rights than any of the four suggested by gay
rights opponents. I contend that gay rights advocates ultimately support a
conservative vision of civil rights. In Part IV, I attempt to understand
what is guiding liberal avoidance of the factual discussion, and suggest
two potential ways that gay rights advocates might respond more directly
to the conservative special rights critique. In doing so, I call for gay
rights advocates to argue the need for special rights for lesbians and gay
men. In particular, I urge the development of and reliance on a thick de-
scription of the special facts to support a claim for special rights.
II. SPECIAL RIGHTS: WHAT Do THE CRITICS MEAN?
When, in Romer v. Evans," the Supreme Court found "implausi-
ble"'2 Colorado's stated defense of Amendment 2" that it did "no more
than deny homosexuals special rights,"'" many gay rights advocates ap-
plauded the Court for "unequivocally stat[ing]" that "[I]aws which pro-
tect people from discrimination . . . provide equal rights, not 'special
rights.""' 5 The special rights/equal rights debate that dominated the dis-
course in campaigns to institute and later to repeal gay rights ordinances
for at least two decades'6 seemed to have come to a halt, at least in fed-
eral courts with regard to referenda that sought to deny sexual minorities,
but no other groups, the opportunity to achieve antidiscrimination pro-
tection from state or local governments.
At the same time that Evans was decided, the Court voted 6-3 to
vacate and remand for reconsideration a Sixth Circuit decision upholding
a ballot-initiative-driven amendment to Cincinnati's Charter that read
strikingly similarly to Amendment 2." Article XII of the Cincinnati
Charter, codifying Issue 3, prohibited the city from granting "special
class status.., based upon sexual orientation, conduct or relationships."'8
Because of the similarities in the two cases and because "every single
11. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
12. Evans, 517 U.S. at 626.
13. Amendment 2 was codified as COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30(b) (1992) and subsequently
declared unconstitutional and permanently enjoined from enforcement in Evans.
14. Evans, 517 U.S. at 626 (paraphrasing the state's principal defense of Amendment 2).
15. Matt Coles, ACLU Applauds Supreme Court Decision Striking Down Colorado's Anti-Gay
Amendment 2, ACLU NEWS & EVENTS (May 20, 1996) (last visited Dec. 22, 1998)
<http://www.aclu.org/newsd n052096b.html>; see also Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a
Day: The Subtle Transformation in Judicial Argument Over Gay Rights, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 893,
955; Rudy Serra, Sexual Orientation and Michigan Law, 76 MIcH. B.J. 948, 949 (1997).
16. For an early expression of the position that gay rights constitute special rights, or at least
are not civil rights, see ANITA BRYANT, THE ANiTA BRYANT STORY 146 (1977) ("[Dade County's]
blundering 'gay' ordinance is no more a civil rights issue than is the arrest of a drunk for disturbing
the peace.").
17. See Equality Found., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996) (Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer for the majority; Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting), vacating and remanding 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995).
18. CINCINNAn, OHio, CHARTER art. XII (1993), quoted in Equality Found., Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 291 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
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anti-gay voter initiative of recent years [had] been rejected by courts,"'9
"gay rights groups were shocked"'2 when the Sixth Circuit, upon recon-
sideration in light of Evans, continued to find the Cincinnati Charter
Amendment constitutional.2 ' That opinion evinces the continued persua-
siveness of the special rights argument.
Writing for a unanimous panel of the Sixth Circuit, Judge Krupan-
sky distinguished Equality Foundation from Evans on several grounds.
First, Equality Foundation involved a city-wide, not state-wide, action.
Consequently, the effects of the Charter Amendment were not as burden-
some for homosexuals to overcome as the statewide constitutional
amendment that would have been required in Colorado. 3 Moreover, in
applying the rational relation test, the court found that, because of the
local scope of the Charter Amendment, the voters' rights were more di-
rectly implicated than they were in Colorado.24 Hence, the court found
that "the valid interests of the Cincinnati electorate in conserving public
and private financial resources is, standing alone, of sufficient weight, to
justify the City's Charter Amendment under a rational basis analysis.2 5
Finally, the court spent a significant amount of time arguing that, while
the Colorado amendment potentially excluded lesbians and gay men
from the protection of ordinary laws, the Cincinnati Charter was not so
broad.26 Rather, it "eliminated only 'special class status' and 'preferential
treatment' for gays as gays under Cincinnati ordinances and policies. 27
The Sixth Circuit's Equality Foundation opinion has already been
attacked by a number of legal scholars and gay rights advocates for mis-
reading Evans. Only time will tell whether these distinctions will last,
although they have been reinforced by the Supreme Court's recent denial
of the petition for writ of certiorari in Equality Foundation.2 9 Although I
19. David E. Rovella, Gay Groups Are Angry at Sexual Preference Ruling-Cincinnati Law
Contradicts High Court Case, They Say, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 10, 1997, at A9 (quoting Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund).
20. Id.
21. See Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 301.
22. See id. at 296.
23. See id. at 296-97.
24. See id. at 300.
25. Id. at 301.
26. See id. at 299-300.
27. Id. at 297.
28. See, e.g., J. Mitchell Armbruster, Deciding Not to Decide: The Supreme Court's
Expanding Use of the G.V.R. Power Continued in Thomas v. American Home Prod., Inc. and
Department of the Interior v. South Dakota, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1387, 1416 (1998); Mark Hansen,
Distinguishing 2 from 3, 6th Circuit Panel Stands by Anti-Gay Rights Initiative Despite Supreme
Court Quashing of Similar Measure, 84 A.B.A. J. 35 (1998).
29. Equality Found., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998) (denying petition for
writ of certiorari). Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, expressly noted that the denial "should not
be interpreted either as an independent construction of the charter or as an expression of its views




mostly agree with the critics as a matter of doctrine, I will use the Equal-
ity Foundation opinion in this article, not for its distinctions from Evans,
but for its blatant acceptance of gay rights as special rights. More im-
portantly, though, the decision reflects a position that all civil rights are
special rights. Since all antidiscrimination law is seen as special by the
court, the primary question seems to be whether special rights are con-
stitutionally required for any given group.
This view of special rights is not new. It can be found in Justice
Scalia's dissent in Evans3" and in, much of the rhetoric in opposition to
gay rights-on the streets, in courts, in testimony before Congress, and
among legislators themselves. Jane Schacter' and Samuel Marcosson32
have pointed out that an almost identical critique can be found in legisla-
tive opposition to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.33 In addition,
Schacter has demonstrated that the "rhetoric of 'special rights' . . . is
laden with corrosive double messages that are hostile to civil rights law
in general."'
When gay rights opponents argue that prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation gives homosexuals special rights, they gener-
ally have one of four connected but distinct positions in mind. These
positions fall roughly into two categories already identified by Samuel
Marcosson in his study of the history and use of the special rights posi-
tion in both the contemporary gay rights context and in civil rights de-
bates in the 1960s."5 That is, they argue either that all civil rights are spe-
cial rights or that gay rights are special because they grant homosexuals
rights that others do not have. Marcosson has done a fine job of docu-
menting these positions but, as I describe below, I do not believe he fully
captures their nuances. Moreover, I believe each of these positions must
be subdivided.
A. Meaning One: Civil Rights Are Special Rights
Samuel Marcosson spends much of his article addressing the equa-
tion of civil rights with special rights. He describes the position as fol-
lows:
[C]ivil rights protections are by their nature "special rights"
and.., sexual orientation is not a valid basis for these rights. This ar-
30. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 637 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of
Equivalents, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 303-07 (1994).
32. Samuel A. Marcosson, The "Special Rights" Canard in the Debate over Lesbian and Gay
Civil Rights, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 137, 144-54 (1995).
33. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also THE CiVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: OPERATIONS MANUAL ON
FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES, PUBLIC ACCOMODATIONS, FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 17-22 (1964)
(providing analysis and legislative history on the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
34. Schacter, supra note 31, at 300.
35. See Marcosson, supra note 32, at 140-44.
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gument is twofold: it argues first that the right to be free from em-
ployment discrimination is in some way "special," and second that
while it is valid to confer this "special right" on the basis of race, sex,
or religion, doing so on the basis of sexual orientation is either unjus-
tified or improper.
36
Although I agree with Marcosson that this version of the special rights
argument assumes that all civil rights protections are special, I disagree
with the second part of his description of the argument that gay-rights
opponents necessarily assume that civil rights are justified in other areas.
Marcosson derives this second part of his description from his per-
suasive argument that the contemporary debate about gay rights is a re-
play of the debate around civil rights in the 1960s, only this time applied
to sexual orientation.37 Perhaps his quotation from Senator Hill's state-
ment in opposition to the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1963 best summa-
rizes the argument: "Under a misleading banner labeled 'equal opportu-
nity,' proponents ...would have the Congress enact what in fact and
substance is 'the Special Privilege Act of 1963.' For rights won at the
expense of others' 'rights are not rights at all, but special privi-
leges .. . ."' Of course this position relies on another argument, which is
that rights of business owners to run their business as they wish should
not be trumped by civil rights legislation. Marcosson then demonstrates
that the special rights position was defeated in the 1960s, and concludes
that therefore any appeal to such a position is now "discredited."39 Con-
sequently, for Marcosson, gay rights opponents must be assuming that
conferring "special rights"' on the basis of other classifications is valid.
In this section, I suggest that the gay rights debate has opened up the
possibility for such appeals to become credited, not just with regard to
gay rights but to all civil rights. When legislators oppose ENDA, for ex-
ample, they often argue that creating a new special class will only repeat
the sins of the past (with regard to other protections). These opponents
often maintain that prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation
would lead to affirmative action or quotas for homosexuals because em-
ployers would be scrutinized to ensure that their workforces are appro-
36. Id. at 140 (footnote omitted). A second meaning, which Marcosson dismisses as nothing
more than "sloganeering," is "that only a limited group possesses the rights in question; the right is
'special' because it is a right not enjoyed by other groups-and hence ought not to be conferred." Id.
at 144; see infra Part I.B (discussing the second argument).
37. See Marcosson, supra note 32, at 144-45.
38. Id. at 149 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 4760 (1964) (statement of Sen. Hill)).
39. Id. at 147. But see id. at 152 (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROuNDS: THE
CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAws 3-5, 505 (1992) to note that the special
rights/free association argument has not been "completely consigned to the scraphead of yesteryear's
intellectual musing and judicial concurrences," but adding that Epstein acknowledges that in making
the argument he is "swim[ming] against a powerful tide of social consensus").
40. Note that Marcosson puts the term "special rights" in quotation marks. See Marcosson,
supra note 32, at 137.
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priately representative of all sexual orientations. Indeed, the dissent in
Evans, the majority opinion in Equality Foundation, and much of the
congressional opposition to ENDA conflate special rights and civil
rights. In doing so, they either overtly argue that all civil rights are spe-
cial and therefore bad, or they avoid the question whether all civil rights
are bad because special, but insist that special rights based on sexual
orientation cannot be justified.
1. The Overt Argument
The argument that all civil rights are special rights and therefore un-
desirable is most overtly and clearly made in congressional debates about
ENDA. That is, opponents of ENDA portray the legislation as an expan-
sion of what they consider intrusive civil rights laws.
Some legislators use the ENDA debate to express their dissatisfac-
tion with Title VII. A statement by Senator Ashcroft typifies the position.
After stating that he believed there ought to be civil rights protection on
the basis of race and sex (but not sexual orientation), he immediately
belied the statement:
But I remember a situation when I was Governor of Missouri in
which one man operating a laundry fired a black woman from the
laundry. She was one of seven black women working in the laundry.
She was replaced by a black woman. But she sued alleging that she
was fired because she was discriminated against on the basis of both
race and sex.
The truth of the matter is that the establishment of protected classes
makes much more difficult the ability of anyone to even use good
judgment in hiring and firing because there is always this threat of
litigation.41
Taken seriously, this statement suggests that there should be no antidis-
crimination law at all.
This backlash against antidiscrimination law can further be seen in
arguments against creating what many Senators consider a "new" pro-
tected class, or a class with special rights. Perhaps Senator Coverdell
from Georgia put it most succinctly: "At a time when we are, as a soci-
ety, questioning the value and effects of affirmative action programs, we
should not be creating a new special category of citizens, a special class
of citizens that will be a new basis for a new round of quotas and litiga-
tion."" In other words, ENDA opponents often point to the problems
they see with antidiscrimination law as it currently stands in arguing
against adding to the protected classifications. As Senator Hatch stated,
ENDA would "open up an entirely new category of preferences and re-
41. 142 CONG. REC. S 10,000 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (emphasis
added).
42. Id. at S 10,004 (statement of Sen. Coverdell).
1998] 1271
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
verse discrimination," 3 despite specific language in the bill to the con-
trary. Pointing to the fact that ENDA would be enforced by the EEOC,
he continued: "I think it will lead to the same sort of sets of preferences
that we see today under Title VII that were said could never happen.""
To be fair, these legislators do not explicitly state that all special
protections are bad. But they do rely on the negative connotation of the
term "special" when they refer generally to special classifications other
than sexual orientation. The question they pose is whether we should add
to what they consider the disastrous effects of Title VII by passing
ENDA. Once again, to be fair, they do not argue that antidiscrimination
law is naturally or necessarily bad. Rather, they contend that, due to the
interpretation of the law and the enforcement power of the EEOC, em-
ployers have been forced into granting preferences to avoid lawsuits. Of
course, they ignore in this latter argument both that courts have inter-
preted all the classifications to protect majorities and minorities, advan-
taged and disadvantaged,45 and that an employer's representative "bottom
line" racial, sexual, ethnic or religious composition does not constitute an
absolute defense to Title VII claims." They also ignore the extent to
which courts have invalidated affirmative action plans. Finally, these
legislators do not suggest any way to implement antidiscrimination laws
that would not lead to what they consider special protection.
2. The "Neutral" Argument
The second version of the argument agrees with the first version that
all civil rights are special rights. Although proponents of this position get
rhetorical punch from the negative connotation that special rights has
taken on in the civil rights arena, they appear agnostic on the issue
whether all special rights are impermissible. Rather, their position is that,
regardless of whether special rights are justified in other civil rights
contexts, they are not justified with regard to gay rights. The argument
nevertheless relies on a slippage between civil rights and special rights.
To explore this position, I focus on two judicial opinions: Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion in Evans and Judge Krupansky's majority
opinion in Equality Foundation. Although the legal issues in these cases
are constitutional, not statutory, the same question is addressed as in the
ENDA debates: Should sexual orientation be treated similarly to race,
43. Id. at S9992 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
44. Id. at S9994.
45. See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682
(1983); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 (1976).
46. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982) (holding that a racially balanced
workforce does not constitute a defense to a disparate impact claim). A bottom line might, however,
provide both a defense to a systemic disparate treatment claim and evidence, though not conclusive
evidence, of nondiscrimination in an individual disparate treatment claim.
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sex, and other "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" classifications? And, if not, is
animus against gay men and lesbians sufficient to find that there is no
rational basis for the law?
As already mentioned, the majority of the Supreme Court in Evans
found "implausible" the notion that Colorado's Amendment 2 did no
more than prohibit special rights for gay men and lesbians. '7 Justice
Scalia, in dissent, vigorously disagreed, reading Amendment 2 as "a
modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional
sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to re-
vise those mores through use of the laws."" The heart of Justice Scalia's
dissent is two-fold. First, the voters only increased the hurdle for homo-
sexuals to obtain special rights, or preferential treatment.' 9 Second, there
was a rational basis for the state to prohibit such special protection for
homosexuals, since the state could constitutionally prohibit the "conduct
that defines the class."' I focus here on Justice Scalia's use of the terms
"special rights" and "preferential treatment," although, as we shall see,
his use of these terms in his first argument is not unrelated to his conduct
argument.'
Throughout his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia refers to Amend-
ment 2 as merely precluding special, or preferential, treatment for homo-
sexuals." At one point, he states that "[t]he amendment prohibits special
treatment of homosexuals, and nothing more."53 He uses the term special
treatment here to respond to the majority's suggestion that Amendment 2
could be read to deprive homosexuals even of the protection of general
laws.' Although the majority claims not to rely on that possibility,5 Jus-
47. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626 (1996).
48. Evans, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49. See id. at 637.
50. Id. at 641. Although the majority does not make the point, it seems that Colorado's
decision to repeal its sodomy statute could undermine this rational basis claim.
51. For discussion and critique of the conflation of status and conduct, see Dan Danielsen,
Identity Strategies: Representing Pregnancy and Homosexuality, in AFrER IDENTITY: A READER IN
LAW AND CULTURE 39, 39-60 (Dan Danielsen & Karen Engle eds., 1995); Janet Halley, The
Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Identities, 36 UCLA
L. REv. 915, 966-67 (1989); Halley, supra note 10, at 442.
52. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 638 ("They may not obtain preferential treatment without
amending the state constitution."); id. at 642 ("[S]urely it is rational to deny special favor and
protection."); id. at 652 ("To suggest, for example, that this constitutional amendment springs from
nothing more than 'a bare desire .. .to harm a politically unpopular group,' is nothing short of
insulting.") (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
53. Id. at 638.
54. See id. at 629-30.
55. See id. at 630. It is arguable, however, that the opinion in fact relies on this possibility.
Janet Halley argues that the Court responded to the argument that Amendment 2 would deny gay
men and lesbians the protection of general laws by "seem[ing] to reject and then adopt [this] reading
of Amendment 2 offered in the Tribe Brief." Halley, supra note 10, at 430 (referring to an amicus
brief filed by Laurence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland and Kathleen M.
Sullivan).
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tice Scalia argues that Amendment 2 should not be interpreted that
broadly. In doing so, his examples are instructive of what he would view
as neutral--or non-preferential-treatment:
[Amendment 2] would not affect ... a requirement of state law that
pensions be paid to all retiring state employees with a certain length
of service; homosexual employees, as well as others, would be enti-
tled to that benefit. But it would prevent the state or any municipality
from making death-benefit payments to the "life partner" of a homo-
sexual when it does not make payments to the long-time roommate of
a nonhomosexual employee. Or again, it does not affect the require-
ment of the State's general insurance laws that customers be afforded
coverage without discrimination unrelated to anticipated risk. Thus,
homosexuals could not be denied coverage, or charged a greater pre-
mium, with respect to auto collision insurance; but neither the State
nor any municipality could require that distinctive health insurance
risks associated with homosexuality (if there are any) be ignored.
56
At least one fault with both of these examples, of course, is that they
ignore background rules about marriage that affect the ability of same-
sex couples, unlike straight couples, to receive insurance benefits for or
with their partners.57
Later, Justice Scalia uses special treatment slightly differently, ar-
guing that Amendment 2 does not even prohibit giving special treatment
to homosexuals. Rather, it only prohibits giving such special treatment to
them on the basis of their homosexuality.58 In this discussion, he makes
clear what he means by special treatment generally. Homosexuals, he
claims, "can be favored for many reasons-for example, because they
are senior citizens or members of racial minorities."59 As Mark Fajer
has noted, referring to the same language, Justice Scalia "apparently
believes that even anti-discrimination laws focused on race are special
protections."
While other critics have identified this slippage in the argument,
they have done so in a way that assumes the identification of the slippage
is the critique. In a recently published article, for example, Joseph Jack-
son argues that Justice Scalia begs the question by deploying preferential
treatment arguments, stating that "Justice Scalia might just as well have
asserted that civil rights laws guaranteeing the rights of racial minorities
56. Evans, 517 U.S. at 638.
57. For a more elaborate treatment of the first example, see infra note 188 and accompanying
text.
58. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 644.
59. Id.
60. Mark A. Fajer, Bowers v. Hardwick, Romer v. Evans, and the Meaning of Anti-
Discrimination Legislation, 2 NAT'L J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 208, 210 (1996).
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to sit at lunch counters accord them preferential treatment. '6 ' Jackson
then quotes from Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in The Civil Rights
Cases-arguing that the legislation in question sought "to secure and
protect rights belonging to [blacks] as freemen and citizens; nothing
more" 6 -in order to dispense with Scalia's position."3 It seems to me,
though, that Jackson too easily dismisses the argument. Justice Scalia
would likely agree that the right to sit at a lunch counter without regard
to race is a special right. The question would then be whether the special
right is justified. Because of the negative implication that special rights
has become imbued with in recent years, critics tend to assume that say-
ing the analysis would apply to race is a sufficient critique. But it is not,
both because it does not get to the heart of the distinction that gay rights
opponents make between race and sexual orientation, for example, and
because it does not acknowledge that the use of special rights rhetoric to
refer to civil rights protections that we tend to take for granted might not
be merely coincidental. It should come as no surprise that some oppo-
nents of gay rights would be looking, as the legislative debate makes
clear, for some retrenchment of civil rights.'
If Justice Scalia slips into a civil rights-are-special position, Judge
Krupansky, writing for the Sixth Circuit panel in Equality Foundation,
dives in. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit's decision relies on a distinction be-
tween Colorado's Amendment 2 and Cincinnati's Article XII. Although
the court puts some emphasis on the difference between a statewide and
local proscription of the protection of gay rights, the decision rests also
on a distinction between denying the protection of "general'65 laws and
prohibiting laws granting special treatment.' The court reads the Colo-
rado Amendment as doing the former and the Cincinnati Charter
Amendment as doing the latter. 7 In doing so, the court accepts a Scalia-
type definition of special rights, but reads the Colorado Amendment as
more expansive than Scalia admits.
At first glance, Amendment 2 and Article XII look strikingly simi-
lar. Indeed, it was because of their similarities that the Supreme Court
remanded Equality Foundation in light of Evans.' Upon remand, how-
ever, the court insisted that there are crucial differences by relying on the
61. Joseph S. Jackson, Persons of Equal Worth: Romer v. Evans and the Politics of Equal
Protection, 45 UCLA L. REv. 453, 466-67 (1997).
62. Id. at 467 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 61 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
63. Id. ("In short, antidiscrimination laws seek to compel legal recognition of the right to equal
treatment, not to accord preferential treatment to those protected. The special rights rhetoric, and the
argument Justice Scalia derives from it, are simply misleading.").
64. See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
65. See Equality Found., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 296 (6th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
66. See Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 295-96.
67. See id. at 296.
68. See id. at 301.
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many statements made by the majority in Evans about the potentially
broad sweep of the Amendment to prohibit homosexuals from receiving
the protection of general laws.69 Even though the majority in Evans in-
sisted that such sweep was not necessary for its finding that the Amend-
ment was unconstitutional," and Justice Scalia denied that the Amend-
ment 2 could or should be read so broadly," the Sixth Circuit relied on
such an interpretation to distinguish Article XII. Midway through the
Equality Foundation opinion, the court quotes and "contrasts" the lan-
guage of both initiatives." In doing so, it bolds certain language to em-
phasize what it considers to be the difference between the texts. The dif-
ference seems to rest primarily in the titles of the provisions. Amendment
2 began with "No Protected Status based on Homosexual, Lesbian or
Bisexual Orientation,"73 whereas the Cincinnati Charter provision begins
with "NO SPECIAL CLASS STATUS MAY BE GRANTED BASED
UPON SEXUAL ORIENTATION, CONDUCT OR RELATIONSHIPS." 4
Through this emphasis, the court suggests a distinction, then, between
protected and special status. It puts in bold some other language as well.
While Amendment 2 prohibited any law that would make homosexuals,
lesbians or bisexuals entitled to "claim any minority status, quota prefer-
ences, protected status or claim of discrimination,"" the Cincinnati
Charter Amendment prohibits giving the same group "any claim of mi-
nority or protected status, quota preference or other preferential treat-
ment." 7
6
Although the court attempts to distinguish the language using bold-
face, the language is not as distinguishable as the court suggests. Indeed,
the language of the Cincinnati Charter itself belies the claim that there is
any difference between protected status and special status. By adding the
words "or other preferential treatment," the Cincinnati Charter includes
"minority or protected status" and "quota preference" as preferential
treatment. If "preferential treatment" were only to include quota prefer-
69. See id. at 295 ("The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific
legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination .... ") (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 627 (1996))). The Court, again quoting Evans, explained that "the amendment imposes a
special disability upon [homosexuals] alone." Id. (quoting Evans, 517 U.S. at 631).
70. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 630 ("If [deprivation of protection from general laws] follows from
Amendment 2, as its broad language suggests, it would compound the constitutional difficulties the
law creates. The state court did not decide whether the amendment has this effect, however, and
neither need we.").
71. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Sixth Circuit acknowledges this point. See Equality
Found., 128 F.3d at 296 n.6.
72. See Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 296.
73. Id. (quoting COLO. CONST. art 11, § 30b (1992) (held unconstitutional and permanently
enjoined from enforcement in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996))) (emphasis added by the court).
74. Id. (quoting CINCINNATI, OHIO, CHARTER art. XII (1993)) (emphasis added by the court).
75. Id. (quoting COLO. CONST. art II, § 30b) (emphasis added by the court).
76. Id. (quoting CINCINNATI, OHIO, CHARTER art. XI) (emphasis added by the court).
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ence (and not minority or protected status), there would likely be an "or"
before the term "quota preference." Moreover, the court continues by
stating that the Cincinnati Charter "merely prevented homosexuals, as
homosexuals, from obtaining special privileges and preferences (such as
affirmative action preferences or the legally sanctioned power to force
employers, landlords, and merchants to transact business with them)
from the City."77 In other words, the court sees preferential treatment, or
special class status, in the same way as Justice Scalia; it not only includes
affirmative action or quotas, but any nondiscrimination provision based
on that status. As such, the only distinction that can be drawn between
the bolded language is the inclusion of the "claim of discrimination"
term in the Colorado Amendment. That difference seems insufficient to
support the court's conclusion that "[i]n stark contrast [to the Cincinnati
Charter], Colorado Amendment 2's far broader language could be con-
strued to exclude homosexuals from the protection of every Colorado
state law." 8 At bottom, then, it seems the difference can only be pinned
on the Evans majority's discussion of that potential read of the Amend-
ment, a reading that it explicitly contended was not essential to its hold-
ing. There is nothing sufficiently different in the language of the initia-
tives to support the Sixth Circuit's distinction. If the Cincinnati Charter
only prohibited special rights for gays-in the Justice Scalia and Judge
Krupansky sense of things-the same would have to be said of the Colo-
rado Amendment.
Another part of the Equality Foundation opinion makes the slippage
between gay-rights-as-special and civil-rights-as-special even more clear.
Working out why the class of homosexuals differs from other classifica-
tions that already receive constitutional protection, the court argues that
invalidating the Cincinnati Charter Amendment would
disenfranchise the voters of their most fundamental right ... to vote
to override or preempt any policy or practice ... to bestow special
rights, protections, and/or privileges upon a group of people who do
not comprise a suspect or a quasi-suspect class and hence are not
entitled to any special favorable legal status. 9
In other words, even nondiscrimination protection given on the basis of a
suspect or quasi-suspect classification would be seen by this court as
special. Although the court suggests that voters would not be able to
override special rights to those groups-at least without a substantial or
compelling interest-the rights are nonetheless considered special.
Using the Evans dissent and the Equality Foundation opinions as ex-
hibits, I would argue that conservatives have for sometime cleverly (if
unconsciously) conflated the notions of special rights and equal rights.
77. Id.
78. Id.; see also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
79. See Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 298 (emphasis added).
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The opinions show, as Marcosson,' Schacter,"' Jackson,82 and Fajer83 have
all argued, that the term "special rights" is often used by gay rights op-
ponents to refer to any antidiscrimination law whatsoever. The term
"special rights" is not simply referring to, as we might assume, "une-
qual" treatment like affirmative action. Rather, any law that provides
protection for groups based on any (traditionally protected) classification
is seen as special. The only question becomes whether such special pro-
tection can be justified. Since special treatment today generally connotes
inappropriate treatment, at least in the civil rights context, the assumption
might be that it rarely can be justified. Certainly, the congressional
backlash against Title VII is suggestive of that view. Federal judges,
however, might be even more reluctant than some legislators to state
such a view, given the entrenchment of antidiscrimination norms in the
law. They take that entrenchment as a given (even while jabbing at it by
calling the norms "special"), and then aim to distinguish the classifica-
tions upon which such special treatment is based. Their attempt to distin-
guish the classifications leads to the second meaning of special rights.
B. Meaning Two: Special Rights As Rights Not Enjoyed by Other Groups
For Marcosson, a second meaning of special rights would be that
"the right is 'special' because it is a right not enjoyed by other groups-
and hence ought not be conferred."' Marcosson dismisses this argument,
however, as "sloganeering,"85 and therefore does not address it in much
detail. Although I agree with Marcosson that the first meaning is preva-
lent among opponents of gay rights, I do not believe that it can be so
easily separated from this second one. The equation of gay rights and
special rights has made for a successful slogan against gay rights, and the
argument often posed is that antidiscrimination protection based on sex-
ual orientation gives homosexuals rights that others do not have. The
argument is made in one of two ways. The thrust of one argument is that
the proscription of discrimination based on sexual orientation grants ho-
mosexuals rights based on conduct. Those rights are then seen as special:
not only are they different from those attached to other protected classifi-
cations, but they guarantee gays rights that others (presumably straights)
are not guaranteed based on conduct such as political affiliation, dress,
and so forth. The second argument is that preventing discrimination
based on sexual orientation only protects homosexuals and bisexuals, not
heterosexuals.
80. Marcosson, supra note 32, at 158.
81. Schacter, supra note 31, at 306-07.
82. Jackson, supra note 61, at 465-67.
83. Fajer, supra note 60, at 210.
84. Marcosson, supra note 32, at 140. For a discussion of Marcosson's main argument, see
supra Part H.A.
85. Marcosson, supra note 32, at 144.
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1. The Conduct Argument
The main text of Marcosson's article provides only one example of
the meaning of special rights as rights not enjoyed by others. It is an ar-
gument based on conduct: "For example, if gay men and lesbians were
granted the right to commit murder, that would be a 'special right' in the
sense that it is not possessed by heterosexuals."' While it seems pretty
clear that no gay rights proponents would advocate this position, and that
the gay rights laws that opponents sought to repeal in Colorado and Cin-
cinnati did not establish any such rights, the tone and sense of the argu-
ment is very present among gay rights opponents. Indeed, in a footnote to
the above statement, Marcosson acknowledges that this meaning "ex-
plain[s] the Supreme Court's anti-gay decision in Bowers v. Hard-
wick... where the Court framed Michael Hardwick's case as if he was
claiming a specific right to engage in 'homosexual sodomy,' rather than
a general right to privacy common to all Americans."8 When Marcosson
published his article, the Supreme Court had not yet decided Evans. By
relying on the same understanding of Hardwick that Marcosson critiques,
however, Justice Scalia's dissent in Evans and Judge Krupansky's deci-
sion in Equality Foundation strongly suggest that, even if nonsensical,
the argument has force. Indeed, this special rights critique offers the
means for distinguishing gay rights from other civil rights.
Justice Scalia and Judge Krupansky might not be phased by the ac-
knowledgment that they treat all civil rights as special rights precisely
because they focus on the extent to which homosexuality differs from
already recognized suspect and quasi-suspect classifications. Once all
such rights are considered special or preferential, the question becomes
why favored treatment is permissible (if not desirable) on the basis of
race (or age) but should not be permissible on the basis of
(homo)sexuality." In addressing this question, Justice Scalia relies heav-
ily on the Court's decision in Hardwick to assert a distinction between
classifications based on status and those based on conduct.89 Homosexu-
ality falls into the latter category for Scalia, as do polygamy, political
party affiliation, adultery, prep school attendance, private club member-
ship, eating habits, sexual harassment, dress habits and sports club pref-
erences. To offer a colorful example of this distinction, Justice Scalia
critiques a regulation of the American Association of Law Schools re-
86. Id. at 140.
87. Id. at 140 n.8 (discussing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1996)).
88. I use parentheses here when referring to (homo)sexuality to indicate that although
sexuality, or sexual orientation, is the proper analogy to race, sex, age, etc., both advocates and
opponents of gay rights often use the term homosexuality. This usage suggests that only
homosexuals, not heterosexuals, would have claims under any law prohibiting discrimination based
on sexual orientation. For further discussion, see infra Part I.B.2.
89. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996).
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quiring member schools to prohibit law firms that discriminate based on
sexual orientation from interviewing at their schools, while-Justice
Scalia suggests-the same employers are free to "refuse to offer a job
because the applicant is a Republican; because he is an adulterer; be-
cause he went to the wrong prep school or belongs to the wrong country
club; because he eats snails; because he is a womanizer; because she
wears real-animal fur; or even because he hates the Chicago Cubs."" If it
is rational to discriminate against snail-eaters and fur-wearers, the argu-
ment goes, it is rational to discriminate against those who engage in ho-
mosexual conduct, or roughly (if not exactly) the class of homosexuals.
The thrust of Scalia's dissent, then, is that homosexuality is more like
snail-eating and fur-wearing than it is like race. Consequently, it should
not be afforded the special status of already protected classifications,
which are in fact based on status rather than conduct.
In the Equality Foundation decision, the Sixth Circuit seems to
agree with Justice Scalia's view that conduct defines the class of homo-
sexuals. Since the Sixth Circuit is bound by the majority in Evans, the
court wisely chooses not to quote from Justice Scalia. But because the
majority in Evans did not address the question of the relationship be-
tween status and conduct,9' the court is able to repeat its pre-Evans (pre-
remand) determination, which relied upon other circuit court opinions
that conflated homosexual status and conduct.' That conflation, the court
seems to assume, provides the basis for not treating sexual orientation as
a suspect or quasi-suspect classification.93 In any event, the question the
court addresses is whether sexual orientation should be afforded special
treatment.9 ' Subjecting discrimination based on sexual orientation to "ra-
tional review," as did the Evans majority," the Sixth Circuit finds a ra-
tional basis for the Charter Amendment.' The court explains that the
90. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 652-53.
91. See Halley, supra note 10, at 429 (providing an illuminating discussion of the absence of
Hardwick in Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Evans); see also infra notes 149-53 and
accompanying text (addressing Halley's discussion of the Evans dissent focusing on conduct versus
the majority's position aimed exclusively at status).
92. See Equality Found., Inc. v. City of Cincinatti, 128 F.3d 289, 293 n.2 (6th Cir. 1997)
(citing Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec.
Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th
Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Padula v. Webster,
822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
93. The court uses the Evans majority decision to apply the rational relationship test to
Amendment 2 without acknowledging that Evans did not equate homosexual status and conduct.
94. See Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 300.
95. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 621 ("If a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to
some legitimate end.").
96. See Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 300.
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Charter passes constitutional muster because saving enforcement and liti-
gation costs could constitute a rational basis for the Cincinnati initiative.9'
This meaning of special rights, then, is in line with the first meaning
discussed-that all civil rights are special rights. It adds bite to the posi-
tion, though, by arguing that rights for homosexuals provide them with
rights that others-fur-wearers and snail-eaters, for example--do not
have. That right is the right not to be discriminated against based on
one's conduct. Perhaps, in this sense, the right becomes extra special.
2. The Conflation of Sexual Orientation and Homosexuality
Another argument that prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation grants homosexuals rights that others do not have suggests a
different idea-that such laws would only protect homosexuals (and bi-
sexuals), not heterosexuals.
Throughout the legislative debates and testimony on ENDA, both
proponents and opponents of ENDA treat the legislation as though it
would protect only the class(es) of homosexuals and bisexuals, rather
than prohibiting discrimination based on the classification of sexual ori-
entation. This focus is not surprising given that the impetus for the bill is
discrimination against homosexuals, just as the impetus for Title VII was
discrimination against blacks. Given the color- and sex-blind course that
antidiscrimination law and Equal Protection analysis have taken, 9 how-
ever, it is puzzling that it is rarely mentioned that ENDA would prohibit
discrimination based on any sexual orientation, or at least heterosexual,
97. See id. In making this finding, the court cites some of the very testimony against ENDA
that I discussed in the previous section. See id. at 300 n.12 (citing 142 CONG. REC. S9992 (daily ed.
Sept. 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch)); see also 142 CONG. REC. S 10,004 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Coverdell); id. at S9997 (statement of Sen. Nickles); id. at S9988-89 (statement
of Sen. Kassebaum); supra Part II.A. 1.
The court in Equality Foundation distinguished its facts from Evans by stating that voters in
Cincinnati, unlike many voters throughout Colorado, would be directly affected by any litigation
costs. Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 300-01. Because the Evans Court did not even look into costs
(and certainly the portion of Amendment 2 that prohibits the state-as opposed to local
governments-from preventing discrimination based on sexual orientation could be equally
motivated by costs), the Court found that only animus could explain the impetus behind the
initiative. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 632. It could be argued that the two courts applied "rational
review" in very different ways. The Sixth Circuit in Equality Foundation held the rational
relationship test to mean the "challenged legislation must stand if it rationally furthers any
conceivable legitimate government interest." Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 293. The Court in Evans,
on the other hand, did not consider any conceivable government interest but instead found the
specific purposes argued by the state to be implausible: "The breadth of the Amendment is so far
removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them." Evans, 517
U.S. at 635.
98. I have critiqued this direction elsewhere. See generally Karen Engle, The Persistence of
Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 317 (1997) (identifying and critiquing the ideology of neutrality that pervades Title VII
jurisprudence, even in the area of religion where some accommodation is anticipated by the statute).
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bisexual or homosexual orientation." If homosexuals really constituted a
"powerful minority," as Justice Scalia and others have suggested,"m it
seems that heterosexuals might look forward to the protection offered
them by ENDA. Without ENDA, discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion, including discrimination against straight people, would seem to be
perfectly permissible.
Even though ENDA defines sexual orientation to include hetero-
sexuality, such inclusion is rarely, if at all, discussed. It seems clear,
though, that the inclusion would protect against the very quotas and other
affirmative action that ENDA opponents imagine. Again, Title VII pro-
vides good precedent. Early on in the interpretation of Title VII, the Su-
preme Court made clear that Title VII's proscription on discrimination
because of race prohibited discrimination against whites as well as
blacks.'' That analysis would almost certainly be applied to ENDA, even
if sexual orientation were not specifically defined to include heterosexu-
ality. But by including heterosexual orientation in the definition, the
ENDA authors seem to have taken no chances.
Specific statutory language notwithstanding, some ENDA oppo-
nents view ENDA as guaranteeing rights to homosexuals but not hetero-
sexuals. Senator Ashcroft from Missouri most overtly depicted this
stance during the Senate debates when he stated: "We should be wary of
telling young people that... you can sue someone for failing to hire you
if you can allege that you are a homosexual-you will not be able to do
that, if you have ordinary sexual orientation."'" Others have made the
argument more subtly, by suggesting that ENDA would create a new
protected class (homosexuality) rather than a new protected classification
(sexual orientation).' 3 Senator Nickles voiced this argument, even after
quoting the bill's definition of sexual orientation and discussing other
protected classifications:
We state under the Civil Rights Act there should be no discrimination
on account of gender, on account of race, on account of your ethnic
99. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act, S. 2056, 104th Cong. § 3(11) (1996) ("The
term sexual orientation means homosexuality, bisexuality or heterosexuality, whether the orientation
is real or perceived.").
100. See, e.g., Evans, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Employment Non-Discrimination
Act, 1996: Hearing on H.R. 1863 Before the Subcomm. on Small Business, 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of Robert H. Knight, Daniel S. Garcia, Paul T. Mero) (not included in CIS microfiche
compilation of the hearing; available at <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp>) ("Homosexuals
display political power far beyond their numbers.").
101. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) ("This conclusion is in
accord with uncontradicted legislative history to the effect that Tite VII was intended to 'cover
white men and white women and all Americans,' and create an 'obligation not to discriminate
against whites."') (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 2579 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler))).
102. 142 CONG. REc. S10,000 (daily ed. Sept 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft). I assume,
for lack of a better guess, that "ordinary sexual orientation" refers to heterosexuality.
103. Id. at S9997 (statement of Sen. Nickles).
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background, or disabilities or age or religion, and now if this amend-
ment becomes law, we would add sexual orientation, and "sexual ori-
entation" would be defined as homosexuality and bisexuality and het-
erosexuality. It actually would elevate homosexuality and bisexuality
as a protected class under the Civil Rights Act. "4
If ENDA would "elevate" homosexuality and bisexuality as protected
classes, however, it would also elevate heterosexuality to such a status.
Perhaps this effect is ignored because it is seen as insignificant. The re-
ality is that few people are discriminated against because of their hetero-
sexuality. Yet, if there is genuine concern that ENDA would put pressure
on employers to give preferences to homosexuals over heterosexuals in
hiring, it seems that ENDA's inclusion of heterosexuality in its definition
of sexual orientation would argue against such a result.
This view of laws (or proposed laws) prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation as granting rights to non-heterosexuals can
be seen in the wording of Colorado's Amendment 2 as well. Although
the Amendment was meant to repeal, among other things, laws in Boul-
der,05 Aspen,' ° and Denver °7 that prohibited discrimination based on
sexual orientation,"° the Amendment prohibited the enactment of any
laws, regulations or policies "whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or other-
wise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or
claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination."'" Indeed, recall that the title of the Amendment reads:
"No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Ori-
entation.""0 Presumably, under Amendment 2, then, protected status
based on heterosexual orientation would have been permissible. In this
sense, only one part of the ordinances would have actually been repealed.
Heterosexuals would presumably have continued to have claims avail-
able under the ordinances."' And although the heading of the Cincinnati
Charter reads that "NO SPECIAL CLASS STATUS MAY BE
GRANTED BASED UPON SEXUAL ORIENTATION, CONDUCT
OR RELATIONSHIPS," the main text of the Article only prohibits pro-
visions giving that status to "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orienta-
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. E.g., BOULDER, COLO., REV. MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 12-1-1 to 12-1-11 (1987).
106. E.g., ASPEN, COLO., MUNICIPAL CODE § 13-98 (1977).
107. E.g., DENVER, COLO., REV. MUNICIPAL CODE, art. IV, §§ 28-91 to 28-116 (1991).
108. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 623-24.
109. COLO. CONST. art. H, § 30b (1992) (found unconstitutional and permanently enjoined in
Evans, 517 U.S. at 635-36).
110. Id.
111. This argument was made by opponents of Amendment 2, but seemed ignored by its
proponents. See Brief for Respondents at 9-10 n. 11, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-
1039).
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tion, status, conduct, or relationship.""' 2 Thus, there is at least a plausible
argument that the Cincinnati. Charter permits special class status based on
heterosexuality.
Perhaps the drafters of Amendment 2 in Colorado and Article XII in
Cincinnati did not understand that, in the absence of the laws they op-
posed, discrimination based on sexual orientation-including quotas for
gays-would be absolutely permissible. They were either unbelievably
clever and sneaky in their wording of the initiatives, or it never occurred
to them that discrimination against heterosexuals would be legal (in the
absence of legislation that they saw as providing the basis for such dis-
crimination). In this way, they used special rights to refer to rights that
they imagined only homosexuals and bisexuals, not heterosexuals, were
receiving. Again,. although it might not have occurred to them that dis-
crimination against heterosexuals was legal because there is little evi-
dence of such discrimination, the same could be said of the lack of fear
of discrimination against whites or men prior to Title VII. Although
those fears primarily arose as a result of the legislation, the judiciary has
made it clear that the statute applies to whites as well as blacks, men as
well as women.
These four positions on special rights, then, are all related and are
made or at least hinted at by most of the opponents of ENDA or of gay
rights more generally. Gay rights opponents have successfully managed
to imbue special rights with negative meaning, even if the slippage in
their arguments suggests that at least some civil rights, though special,
might also be palatable.
There is an amazing dissonance between the arguments that gay
rights opponents make and the responses that proponents give. As the
next Part shows, ENDA proponents respond to yet another meaning of
special rights, one rarely if ever put forward by opponents. Moreover,
unlike ENDA opponents, proponents seldom, if ever, suggest that special
rights might sometimes be justified. Instead, they simply deny that
ENDA would grant special rights.
Ill. SPECIAL RIGHTS: WHAT DO GAY RIGHTS ADVOCATES MEAN?
The Employment Non-Discrimination Act was first introduced in
the Senate in 1994."' Ironically, its best chance of passage came in 1996
when some legislators attempted to add it as an amendment to the De-
fense of Marriage Act ("DOMA").'14 These legislators argued that, even
112. CINCINNATI, OHIO, CHARTER art. XI (1993).
113. S. 2288, 103d Cong. (1994).
114. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996); see Eric Schmitt,
Senate Weighs Bill on Gay Rights on the Job, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 7, 1996, at Al ("Proponents of the
bill originally intended to offer it as an amendment to a measure barring federal recognition of same-
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if gay men and lesbians should not be entitled to marry, they should not
be discriminated against in employment. Although in the end, as a result
of a compromise, ENDA was offered as a free standing bill shortly after
the passage of DOMA,"' it failed in the Senate by one vote and never
made it to the House.
Aside from the Senate floor debate in 1996, a number of hearings
have been held on ENDA. The Senate Labor Committee held hearings in
July 1994 "6 and October 1997,"' and the House Small Business Govern-
ment Programs considered the bill in July 1996."' Although testimony
against the bill was presented in 1994"' and 1996," there was no voiced
opposition to it in October 1997. In fact, Senator Jeffords, one of the
bill's co-sponsors, opened the 1997 Labor Committee hearings by
claiming that, although he "expected that [he] would have witnesses
yearning to testify in opposition to the bill[,] ... [his] staff scoured the
country for witnesses with differing opinions, to no avail."'2 ' Senator
Jeffords attributed this lack of opposition testimony to changes made to
the bill in response to criticisms of previous versions.'22 Indeed, the bill
has changed in appreciable ways since 1994, all of which have been
noted in subsequent testimony.' 3 Those changes seem largely to have
been an attempt to respond to the "special rights" critics.
In this Part, I study gay rights advocacy by examining congressional
testimony and debate in support of ENDA.24 I use the debate over ENDA
as a laboratory for dissecting the responses that gay rights advocates
have given to what they imagine to be the special rights critique(s).
sex marriages. But Sen. Trent Lott of Mississippi, the majority leader, promised to use a procedural
maneuver to keep the Democrats from amending the marriage bill.").
115. Pub. L. No. 104-109, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
116. Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 1994: Hearing on S. 2238 Before the Commn on
Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong. (1994) [hereinafter ENDA 1994 Hearing].
117. Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 1997: Hearing on S. 869 Before the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter ENDA 1997 Hearing].
Coincidentally, these hearings were on October 23, 1997, the same day the Equality Foundation
opinion was handed down.
118. Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 1996: Hearing on H.R. 1863 Before the Subcomm.
on Small Business, 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter ENDA 1996 Hearing].
119. See ENDA 1994 Hearing, supra note 116, at 90 (statement of Robert H. Knight); id.
(statement of Joseph E. Broadus, George Mason School of Law) (not included in CIS microfiche
compilation of the hearing; available at <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp>).
120. See ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118 (statement of Robert H. Knight, Daniel S.
Garcia, Paul T. Mero) (not included in CIS microfiche compilation of the hearing; available at
<http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp>); id (statement of Joseph E. Broadus, Family Research
Council) (not included in CIS microfiche compilation of the hearing; available at <http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/congcomp>).
121. ENDA 1997 Hearing, supra note 117, at 2 (statement of Sen. Jeffords, Committee
Chairperson).
122. See id.
123. See, e.g., id. (detailing the changes made to ENDA since 1994).
124. This study is primarily based on the 1996 and 1997 testimony.
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This study reveals that ENDA proponents in fact spend a significant
amount of time responding to the argument that gay rights are special
rights. In doing so, they nearly always treat special rights as a negative
term; they continually claim that they support equal rights, not special
rights. In this sense, they parrot many gay rights opponents. (The group
that organized the Cincinnati Initiative called itself "Equal Rights Not
Special Rights.") Most striking about these arguments, however, is that
they seem to be responding to a meaning of special rights that is rarely
put forth, at least overtly, by gay rights opponents. That is, they tend to
see the special rights critique as suggesting that gay rights advocates are
seeking what is often called "preferential," rather than equal treatment.
They defend ENDA in part, for example, by insisting that it would not
grant or permit quotas or affirmative action for gay men and lesbians.
The special rights critique to which ENDA proponents respond,
then, should be familiar to those who follow affirmative action debates.
There, one argument against affirmative action is that it treats individuals
differently based on race or some other prohibited classification by
granting "preferences" to one or more groups. In that argument, prefer-
ential treatment and special rights are treated as synonymous, much the
way they are by gay rights opponents. In the affirmative action debate,
however, the critique is that individuals both majority and minority
should be free from discrimination because of a particular classification.
In contrast, the special rights critique poised at ENDA and other attempts
at securing gay rights argues against the classification being protected at
all. Of course, as the legislative debates discussed in Part H indicate, gay
rights opponents do sometimes see affirmative action as an inevitable
result of any antidiscrimination law. Even that critique, however, is
rarely addressed by ENDA advocates.
Perhaps the defense of ENDA that it does not grant preferences is
not as unresponsive as it might at first seem. As Jane Schacter has aptly
shown, the term "special rights," when used by gay rights opponents,
"deliberately elid[es three] distinct legal concepts-antidiscrimination
provisions, affirmative action, and quotas."'" Through the deployment of
what Schacter names a "discourse of equivalents,"'" she argues, oppo-
nents of gay rights "create and reinforce antipathy to gay men and lesbi-
ans, in particular, and to civil rights law more generally."'27 Schacter per-
suasively challenges gay rights advocates to move beyond this discourse
by "contesting its potent, if concealed, attack on the legitimacy of all
civil rights law."'" Unfortunately, I argue, ENDA advocates have not
responded to that challenge. Rather than contest the elision of the con-
cepts, they have accepted and perpetuated it.
125. Schacter, supra note 31, at 302.
126. Id. at 285.




This Part will focus on the two most frequent arguments on behalf
of ENDA-that it is economically efficient and that it does not guarantee
special rights. These two principal advocacy positions, I contend, impli-
cate much more than a debate about gay rights. Just as the special rights
critique suggests a retrenchment in civil rights law generally, ENDA
advocacy signals a victory for anti-affirmative action forces. Put more
strongly, the party line supporting ENDA is a conservative one. It sug-
gests that economic efficiency should provide significant guidance in the
determination of whose rights should be protected and that affirmative
action and quotas are negative and are unrelated to "equality." Although
my primary target here is the second argument, I begin with a few com-
ments about the first.
A. Argument One: ENDA Is Economically Efficient
In testifying on behalf of ENDA, representatives of several Fortune
500 Companies, as well as legislators, have continually pointed out that
the bill is good for business. That is, employment discrimination against
lesbians, gay men and bisexuals is inefficient because it keeps otherwise
capable workers out of the workplace. It seems odd that corporations
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation would tip their
hand by giving away a secret to their economic success. To the extent
that nondiscrimination gives them an edge, one would think that a corpo-
ration would exploit that competitive advantage in the marketplace. Cor-
porations that blindly follow their irrational homophobia would lose out.
And, if some economists were believed, discrimination would disappear
as a result.
So why would private companies encourage Congress to mandate
good (efficient) business practice? The argument has obvious rhetorical
power. It displaces the "moral" issues '29 and responds to the concern that
ENDA might improperly infringe upon employer rights. When looking
closely at the ways the argument is articulated, however, a xenophobic
hue appears. Economic efficiency is not merely important for individual
businesses in the United States; it is important for the United States as a
whole because American businesses compete in the global market. As
Raymond Smith, Chair and CEO of Bell Atlantic stated: "No company
can afford to waste the talents and contributions of valuable employees
as we compete in a global marketplace. It is good business, and it is good
citizenship.""'3 His use of the term citizenship is peculiar here. Is he sug-
gesting that to be a good American, one should not discriminate against
other Americans? That argument is familiar, suggesting that we should
129. But see Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57
U. Prrr. L. REV. 237 (encouraging gay rights advocates to begin to address-rather than avoid-
issues of morality).
130. ENDA 1997 Hearing, supra note 117, at 11 (statement of Raymond W. Smith, Chairman
and CEO, Bell Atlantic Corp.).
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set aside our internal differences in order to conquer as a whole. Repre-
sentative Torkildsen made a similar statement in opening his Govern-
ment Programs Subcommittee's hearing on ENDA: "[T]he long-term
impact of discrimination has the potential of impeding our nation's prog-
ress in the 21st century global marketplace."' 3 ' And for Senator Kennedy:
Job discrimination is not only un-American-it is counterproductive.
It excludes qualified individuals, lowers workplace productivity, and
hurts us all. For the nation to compete effectively in a global econ-
omy, we have to use all our available talent, and create a work envi-
ronment where everyone can excel.
This view is shared by leaders in both labor and management, who
understand that ending discrimination based on sexual orientation is
good for workers, good for business, good for the economy, and good
for the country. 2
The fact that many large corporations support ENDA (and have their
own nondiscrimination policies) makes for a palatable argument in Con-
gress. What is never suggested, though, is that nondiscrimination might
only be efficient if all businesses are forced to follow it. To the extent
that customers can choose between companies that do and do not pro-
hibit discrimination based on sexual orientation (or provide partner bene-
fits), it seems likely that those companies that prohibit discrimination
would like to avoid the Disney effect.'33
B. Argument Two: ENDA Does Not Provide Special Rights
The second primary argument in defense of the bill is more an apol-
ogy than a point of advocacy. Almost everyone who has testified on be-
half of ENDA has pointed out that its scope is very limited and that it
does not provide special rights."M When proponents argue that ENDA
does not guarantee special rights, however, they seem to have a different
131. ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118, at 2 (statement of Rep. Torkildsen, Subcommittee
Chairperson).
132. ENDA 1994 Hearing, supra note 116, at 2 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy); see
also ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118, at 65, 66 (statement of Mike Morley, Eastman Kodak
Co.) ("Our competitive position will clearly be strengthened by increasing understanding of the
value of people's diverse opinions, on a global basis .... A truly diverse global workforce will be
our greatest strength in a fiercely competitive marketplice.").
133. The Walt Disney Company adopted a domestic partnership policy, leading the Southern
Baptist Convention to stage a boycott against Disney in 1997. The 12,000 delegates approved a
resolution that called for "every Southern Baptist to take stewardship of their time, money and
resources so seriously that they refrain from patronizing The Disney Co. and any of its related
entities." Nancy Knauer, Domestic Partnership and Same-Sex Relationships: A Marketplace
Innovation and a Less Than Perfect Institutional Choice, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 337,
345 n.43 (1998).
134. See, e.g., ENDA 1997 Hearing, supra note 117, at 42 (statement of Chai R. Feldblum); id.
at 2 (statement of Sen. Jeffords); id. at 91 (statement of Christopher E. Anders, ACLU).
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idea about the meaning of special rights than those expressed by any of
the four positions taken by the opponents of gay rights.
Perhaps proponents' view of special rights can best be seen in their
arguments about equal rights. For proponents, equal rights would seem to
require that gays, straights, and bisexuals be treated identically with re-
gard to employment. As Chai Feldblum, one of the authors of ENDA
explained: "[T]he bill's language (that individuals should not be sub-
jected to 'a different standard or different treatment') was designed to
clarify that gay people were seeking the right to the same equal treatment
that all other individuals enjoy in the workplace.' 35
If equal rights means identical treatment for ENDA advocates, spe-
cial rights would seem to signal different, or "preferential," treatment.
Affirmative action and quotas would fall into the latter category, as
would benefits for domestic partners. President Clinton wrote to the Sen-
ate Labor Committee in his letter in support of ENDA: "[Y]our bill spe-
cifically prohibits preferential treatment on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion, including quotas. It also does not require employers to provide spe-
cial benefits.' 36 The President's sentiments are echoed throughout pro-
ENDA testimony.
Indeed, it is quite common in the testimony for a statement that
ENDA provides equal, not special, rights to be immediately explained by
ENDA's prohibition of quotas or affirmative action. As Senator Jeffords
explained: "Although ENDA helps create equal rights for job opportuni-
ties, it does not create any 'special rights' for gays and lesbians. In fact,
this legislation expressly prohibits preferential treatment based on sexual
orientation.' 37 Another advocate testified: "There is nothing radical or
even questionable in this legislation. It is clear, straightforward, and fo-
cused like a laser beam on an achievable objective-which is equal
treatment in the workplace for everyone. It places no burden on small
business, it imposes no costs, and it dictates no quotas.' 38 Indeed, advo-
cates alternatively describe the legislation not only as not radical, but as
"conservative,' '39  "narrow,' ' 14° "modest,' 4 ' and "moderate."'4 2  When
135. Id. at 37 (statement of Chai R. Feldblum) (quoting section 4 of ENDA).
136. Letter to Senator Edward M. Kennedy on Proposed Employment Non-Discrimination
Legislation, II PUB. PAPERS, WILLIAM J. CLINTON 1632 (Oct. 19, 1995).
137. ENDA 1997 Hearing, supra note 117, at 1 (statement of Sen. Jeffords, Committee
Chairperson).
138. ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118, at 77, 78 (statement of Brenda Cole, Board of
Directors, Wainright Bank & Trust Co.); see also id. at 71 (statement of Elizabeth Birch) ("[ENDA]
imposes no costly mandates, dictates no quotas, and specifically prohibits special treatment .... ");
ENDA 1997 Hearing, supra note 117, at 42 (statement of Chai R. Feldblum) ("[ENDA] prohibits an
employer from adopting a quota based on sexual orientation and from giving preferential treatment
to an individual based on the individual's sexual orientation.").
139. ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118 (statement of Debbie Della Piana, Millipore Corp.)
(not included in CIS microfiche compilation of the hearing; available at <http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/congcomp>) ("ENDA is clean,-simple, conservative legislation which does not establish
quotas or impose additional costs.").
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Senator Jeffords noted that no one wanted to testify against the bill be-
fore the Labor Committee, he suggested that the lack of opposition was
due to the changes that were made to the bill after the Senate failed to
pass it in 1996. Those changes included prohibiting employers from col-
lecting statistics based on sexual orientation, clarifying that affirmative
action would be prohibited even as a direct remedial measure in a con-
sent decree, and increasing the exemption for religious organizations.' 3
Even before these changes, advocates insisted that the bill was nar-
row. In addition to pointing to the above limitations, they also repeatedly
reminded opponents that the bill did not require employers to grant do-
mestic partner benefits to gay couples. Although such benefits would
appear to make good business sense, given that a significant number of
the same Fortune 500 companies that have antidiscrimination clauses
based on sexual orientation also include domestic partner benefits, those
testifying on behalf of ENDA have used the bill's failure to require do-
mestic partner benefits as support for the proposition that the bill does
not guarantee special rights, and is limited.'" Why domestic partner bene-
fits would be special or inappropriate is never explained; it is simply
assumed.'
When advocates address the special rights critique, then, they gener-
ally do so by emphasizing that the bill does not require, and now does
not even permit, affirmative action or quotas. There is a certain irony in
this position. As suggested in the previous Part, to the extent that quotas
or other "preferential" treatment for homosexuals are seen as discrimi-
natory, they would currently seem to be permissible, as discrimination
based on sexual orientation is not prohibited by federal law.'" Under this
reading, ENDA could be seen as protecting heterosexuals from discrimi-
nation, particularly if homosexuals are seen as a powerful minority.
140. 142 CONG. REc. S9995 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Senator Kerrey) ("I think
the sponsors of this legislation . . . have done a very good job of trying to draft it in a narrow
way.... "); ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118, at 69 (statement of Paula Alexander, Eastman
Gelatine Corp.) ("IT]he bill also supports business by taking a narrowly tailored approach.").
141. ENDA 1997 Hearing, supra note 117, at 91 (statement of Christopher E. Anders, ACLU).
142. 142 CONG. REc. S10,131 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Robb) ("[ENDA] is
moderate, reasonable, and eminently fair.").
143. ENDA 1997 Hearing, supra note 117, at 2 (statement of Sen. Jeffords).
144. See, e.g., ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118, at 128 (statement of Chai R. Feldblum).
145. One individual testifying on behalf of ENDA stated that he favored domestic partner
benefits, but that "there are other ways to approach their provision than through legislation." Id at
56 (opening statement of the Hon. Earl Blumenauer). Further evidence cited in support of the
proposition that ENDA is narrow is that it does not permit disparate impact claims. Although no one
connects domestic partner benefits and disparate impact, it would certainly seem that a company's
policy providing benefits for spouses but not domestic partners would be ripe for a disparate impact
challenge, were one permitted. Oddly, Chai Feldblum argued that the bill does not cover disparate
impact claims because the discrimination to which gay men and lesbians are generally subjected is
of the overt type. See ENDA 1997 Hearing, supra note 117, at 38 (statement of Chai R. Feldblum);
see also ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118, at 56 (opening statement of Hon. Earl Blumenauer).
146. See supra Part l.B.2.
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The primary point of the above discussion is to show the extent to
which ENDA advocates fail to address the special rights critiques posed
by opponents. Opponents argue that all protections against discrimina-
tion are special. But while such protection might (or might not) be justi-
fied for race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, or age, they main-
tain, it is not justified for sexual orientation. What opponents are asking
for, then, is such justification. To the extent that proponents provide a
justification, they only do so indirectly, with arguments about economic
efficiency or good business practice.
IV. RESPONDING TO THE SPECIAL RIGHTS CRITIQUE
If arguments about economic efficiency and good business practice
do not respond to opponents of gay rights, how should gay rights advo-
cates promote or defend the legal reforms they propose?
Liberals and conservatives both seem to share an inability to distin-
guish sexual orientation from other classifications that are not afforded
protection. Recall Justice Scalia's representative list of those unprotected
against discrimination by the Association of American Law Schools:
Republicans, adulterers, attendees of certain prep schools or members of
certain country clubs, snail-eaters, womanizers, fur-wearers, Chicago
Cubs-haters.' 7 For Justice Scalia, homosexuals should also fall into this
group of the unprotected, presumably because of their conduct. That is,
Justice Scalia's list tends to focus on conduct. Because he sees sexual
conduct as defining the class of homosexuals, he argues that they should
be added to the list of the unprotected.' 8 By eliding conduct and status in
this way, Justice Scalia is able to avoid the question whether special
rights are permissible based on what he might consider status classifica-
tions, such as race and sex, while challenging liberals to justify protec-
tion for those who engage in homosexual conduct.
Janet Halley has shown one way that liberals have avoided Justice
Scalia's, question. If Justice Scalia's dissent in Evans focuses solely on
conduct, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion is aimed exclusively at
status. Borrowing from different portions of the opinion, Halley explains:
Romer makes a major departure from this dispute [over the relation-
ship between Hardwick and Amendment 2], a shift from thick to thin
description, from realism to nominalism. It describes and populates
the class under consideration in a self-consciously nominal gesture:
"the named class, a class we shall refer to as homosexual persons or
gays and lesbians." This is "a single named group" defined by "a sin-
gle trait." "Homosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class":
the Amendment "classifies homosexuals to make them unequal to
147. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652-
53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
148. For an analysis of other case law that conflates conduct and status but focuses on conduct,
see Danielsen, supra note 51, at 47-49.
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everyone else"; "It is a classification of persons undertaken for its
own sake" and in that sense it is a "status-based enactment": "[C]lass
legislation ... [is] obnoxious. ... "49
Halley argues that the Evans majority uses the term status in the histori-
cal sense. That is, status does not refer to a type of person, but rather to a
type of relationship-"Not kleptomaniac or drug addict but commoner,
prince, infant.""' Halley concludes that "[f]or purposes of the majority's
analysis, then, the real content of the class is quite beside the point: if the
same discrimination were inflicted on blondes or burglars, the same con-
clusion would follow. '' 51
Halley's analysis highlights the extent to which the Evans majority
has altogether avoided Justice Scalia's challenge. By demonstrating that,
in principle, the majority's analysis would apply to blondes and burglars,
Halley shows how the historical sense of status relied on by the majority
can encompass contemporary notions of both status (blondes) and con-
duct (burglars). In doing so, she undermines Justice Scalia's assumption
that the reason that homosexuality should not be protected is because it is
essentially a category based on conduct. More damaging perhaps,
though, she uncovers the inability of the majority to distinguish homo-
sexuality from any other unprotected classification. By "declining to
know or say anything about the social representational world of sexual
orientation personhoods,"'' 2 the majority is unresponsive to Justice
Scalia' s analogy. '53
.Why is the question posed by Justice Scalia so difficult for liberals
to respond to? Why are gay rights advocates so reluctant to argue that
homosexuals are in need of special rights or even that they are frequent
victims of discrimination?
First, as a strategic matter, polls suggest that it would be political
suicide to argue that gays should be guaranteed special rights. The public
seems more responsive to the suggestion that gays should be given equal
rights than that they be given special rights." Yet, the polls beg the
149. Halley, supra note 10, at 439-40 (second and third alterations in original) (footnotes
omitted).
150. Id. at 440. Of course, the use of status to describe a type of person might well coincide
with Justice Scalia's use of conduct. Kleptomaniac and drug addict can refer to conduct in the same




153. For Halley, "this 'speech act of a silence' ... leav[es] the attribution of status on the basis
of conduct and the attribution of conduct on the basis of status to the political sphere whose actions
are under judicial review." Id. (quoting EvE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPIsTIMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET
3 (1990)).
154. See Roderick M. Hills, You Say You Want a Revolution? The Case Against the
Transformation of Culture Through Antidiscrimination Laws, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1588, 1635 n.70
(1997). When the question is posed as to whether homosexuals should be granted "special
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question, since the meaning of equal rights is as contested as that of spe-
cial rights. Recall that proponents of Amendment 2 in Colorado and Ar-
ticle XII in Cincinnati argued for equal rights (not special rights) for les-
bians and gay men. They succeeded in passing referenda to repeal gay
rights ordinances with that argument.
Second, liberals seem reluctant to focus on discrimination against
gay men and lesbians because they want to avoid what Jane Schacter has
called the "misguided search for sameness."'5 For Schacter, conserva-
tives engage in this misguided search by suggesting that "the entry bar-
rier for civil rights protection can be overcome only if the forms and
phenomenology of discrimination against gay men and lesbians are the
same as for other protected groups."'56 But conservatives are not alone in
this search. No doubt one of the reasons that some gay rights advocates
disavow that they are seeking affirmative action is to avoid suggesting
that sexual orientation should be treated the same as race (or sex), even if
in doing so they deny the utility of affirmative action for any group.
How might gay rights advocates respond to the special rights critics
without falling into the trap of the search for sameness? How might they
respond to Justice Scalia's critique of the American Association of Law
Schools? It seems to me that there are two potential responses.
First, gay rights advocates could argue, as they sometimes suggest,
that no one should be subject to arbitrary discipline in the workplace.
They could join forces with those who argue for changing the back-
ground rule from employment-at-will to a background rule that all em-
ployment decisions be "for cause.""' The second option would be to ar-
gue that, unlike those mentioned in the rest of Justice Scalia's list of the
unprotected, gay men and lesbians are in need of protection because of
the many background legal rules that work against them and because of
the systemic discrimination they suffer.
The first option responds to Justice Scalia's position in much the
way that Janet Halley suggests the majority in Evans treated the issue.' 8
This option concedes that no meaningful distinction can necessarily be
drawn between sexual orientation and other classifications based on con-
protections," the majority of persons oppose the protections. Id. For example, in a Los Angeles
Times Poll, 26 percent support such protection while 66 percent oppose such protection. Id. (citing
Los ANGELES TIMES POLL (July 29, 1994), available in LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File). In
contrast, between 74 and 83 percent claim to favor equal rights for homosexuals. Id.
155. Schacter, supra note 31, at 296-300.
156. Id. at 296.
157. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1967); Paul H. Tobias,
Current Trends in Employment Dismissal Law: The Plaintiffs Perspective, 67 NEB. L. REV. 178,
181-84 (1988); Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1816 (1980).
158. See Halley, supra note 10, at 437-45; see also supra notes 149-53 and accompanying
text).
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duct or status, but that no distinction needs to be drawn because all of the
classifications are irrelevant for job purposes. "9 Or for the Evans major-
ity, no group should be made a stranger to the laws. In fact, this position
is occasionally suggested in the ENDA debate when advocates argue that
everyone deserves the right to "earn a livelihood,"'" although they then
fail to address why many (unprotected) groups do not have such a right.
This approach would require an overt appeal to eliminate employment-
at-will as the background rule. Although I am in favor of changing the
background rule of employment-at-will, my concern with the strategy as
a means to protect gay men and lesbians from employment discrimina-
tion is that it only shifts the terrain, not the substance, of the debate. In-
deed, a recent decision by the Salt Lake City Council to repeal its anti-
discrimination ordinance highlights the potential dangers of this ap-
proach.
In January 1998, the Salt Lake City Council voted to repeal a re-
cently passed ordinance prohibiting discrimination based on race, relig-
ion, sex, national origin, age, disability, or sexual orientation.'6 ' Although
the debate centered on the inclusion of the term sexual orientation, City
Council members voting for the repeal insisted that they were against
any ordinance that listed protected classes because the City should not
discriminate against anyone. As the Salt Lake City Attorney explained:
No one sanctions or approves employment discrimination against
any person, but the majority of the Council felt that there are better
ways of providing protection against discrimination and possible
hostile working environment situations than by dividing employees
into "groups" and defining rights based on an employee's sexual
orientation. 
62
Drafting up a new ordinance protecting everyone proved to be quite dif-
ficult, as the debate then shifted to the issue of what characteristics are
related to job performance. In particular, the City Attorney proposed a
new "generic" ordinance requiring that employment decisions be "ra-
tionally based on job related criteria."''6 3 The letter he wrote to the Coun-
159. There might, of course, be some exceptions. Most would probably agree, for example, that
the GOP ought to be permitted to hire only Republicans. That is, a decision to reject a Democratic
applicant because she was a Democrat would be seen as a decision based on "cause."
160. See, e.g., ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118, at 69 (statement of Paula Alexander,
Eastman Gelatine Corp.) ("This bill is about one simple thing-and that is that all Americans should
be able to earn a livelihood."); 142 CONG. REC. S10,131 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Robb) ("Those of us who support the Employment Non-Discrimination Act have a simple plea-
let's end discrimination in the workplace.").
161. See Rebecca Walsh, S.L Council Repeals Gay-Protection Law, SALT LAKE TRiB., Jan. 14,
1998, at B 1.
162. Letter from Roger F. Cutler, City Attorney, to Salt Lake City Council 2 (March 4, 1998)
(letter on file with Denver University Law Review).
163. The proposed ordinance stated in pertinant part:
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cil in support of the proposal, however, ended with the following telling
footnote: "A possible exception would exist for those members of these
types of classes where the traits or conduct of the individuals can demon-
strably be established as contrary to a bona fide job qualification."'"
Critics of the proposed ordinance, myself included, argued that this foot-
note left the city free to discriminate against homosexuals by suggesting
that sexual orientation could be a job related characteristic.1 65 At best, it
made protection uncertain.'"
Employment decisions and practices in the Salt Lake City Government's classified career
service and civil service are prohibited, if they are not rationally based on job related
criteria.
1. "Job related criteria" includes: (a) personal and professional attributes, such as the
abilities, qualifications, experience, character, integrity, inter personal skills,
education andtraining, which a person must have to successfully perform the job held
or desired, and meet the prerequisites specified in the appropriate written job
description; (b) in disciplinary matters, conduct which: (i) adversely affects job
performance: (ii) disrupts the workplace; (iii) undermines the authority of
management; (iv) impairs close working relationships essential to the efficiency of
the workplace; or (v) otherwise impedes a safe, efficient and effective work
environment; and (c) criteria based on business necessity.
2. Immutable physical or personal characteristics that are irrelevant to successful job
performance or business necessity are not "job related" criteria, as that term is used in
this section.
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, DRAFT ORDINANCE § 2.53.030B. (Mar. 4, 1998). For a discussion of the
proposed ordinance, see Rebecca Walsh, For Now, S.L Council Holds Its Fire in War Over Words;
Council Working on New Discrimination Ordinance, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 20, 1998, at Al.
164. Cutler, supra note 162, at 6 (citing Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (11 th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 118 U.S. 693 (1997)).
165. See Walsh, supra note 161.
166. As one Salt Lake attorney put it: "Why make this ordinance seem like something it really
is not? Sometimes having the pretext of protection is more dangerous than being honest about
having no protection at all and letting everyone know it." Id. (quoting Ross Anderson).
On November 17, 1998, after eight months of negotiation spurred by controversy over the
proposed ordinance, the City Council finally adopted an ordinance that some members claimed
would prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. In its definition of characteristics on
which employment decisions could not be based, it included: "The status of having a lifestyle which
is irrelevant to successful job performance; and the status of being in or outside of an adult
interpersonal or a family relationship." SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, ORDINANCE § 2.52.255 (1997). Of
course, the first part of the provision is tautological; it says nothing about what type of lifestyle is
irrelevant to performance. The second part, though awkward, would seem to offer protection to
lesbian and gay employees as well as to many more types of relationships than the council intended
(such as polygamous relationships).
The way this ordinance emerged-merely to avoid including the term "sexual orientation" in
the ordinance-did not go unnoticed. As council member Deeda Seed, the author of the repealed
ordinance prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, noted: "The goal for some of my
colleagues clearly was not to say 'sexual orientation.' They didn't. It's not here. If this weren't so
painful, it would be hilarious." Rebecca Walsh, S.L Council to Vote on Calling Sexual Orientation
'Lifestyle,' SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 16, 1998, at Dl (quoting Council Member Deeda Seed). More
importantly, the ordinance is still relatively vague. According to one gay rights advocate:
In their attempts to avoid at all lengths the use of the words 'sexual orientation,' they are
ending up with a very clever ordinance .... The problem with vagueness and ambiguity
in ordinances is people don't know when they're protected and the people who have to
follow the law don't know what to do.
Id. (quoting Jon Davidson, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund).
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The difficulty with the for-cause approach, then, is that it skirts the
issue of whether decisions based on sexual orientation can ever be for
cause. That violence might be more likely in a workplace with openly
gay employees, for example, might lead an employer to concur with the
military that being openly gay is incompatible with the job. Of course, it
could also lead to the conclusion that homophobia is incompatible with
the job. Nevertheless, only the terrain of the debate, not its substance, has
shifted.
A more radical deployment of this first option would be to disrupt
the employment-at-will assumption by demonstrating that such a back-
ground norm gives employers special rights to discriminate. Rather than
putting the burden on gay employees to show that it is irrational to dis-
criminate against them, the burden would be on employers to justify their
special right to discriminate based on sexual orientation.6' This would
not mean, of course, that employers could never justify their decisions,
only that the burden would have shifted. Again, the terrain of the debate
would be similar.
The second option, I believe, is more appealing than the first, al-
though the two are not mutually exclusive. This option calls for an un-
apologetic argument in favor of legal protection for gay men and lesbians
because the protection is necessary. It is similar to Schacter's call for
increasing visibility. ' Moreover, it responds to the search for sameness
by exposing its underlying fallacy: classifications or groups are not pro-
tected because of their inherent similarities. Rather, protected classifica-
tions such as sex, race, disability, and religion each have their unique
characteristics. Advocates for women, racial and religious minorities,
and the disabled have succeeded largely by convincing legislators that
the facts called for their protection. Schacter argues:
What gay men and lesbians share with other groups already protected
under civil rights laws is not the reductive social similarity demanded
by the discourse of equivalents. The common ground can be found at a
higher level of generality: social subordination and stigmatization sub-
Michael McConnell has offered a more generous reading of the Council's actions:
For all its awkwardness the City Council is onto something. Even if we have reservations
about the particular wording it adopted last week, the council deserves credit for
attempting to find a solution to the gay-rights problem that protects the civil rights of gay
citizens without insulting and stigmatizing many other citizens who conscientiously
believe-for religious and other reasons-that homosexual conduct is immoral.
Michael W. McConnell, Salt Lake City Council Deserves Credit for Wrestling with Gay Rights
Ordinance, SALT LAKE TRm., Nov. 22, 1998, at AA6.
167. This result would be akin to heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation in equal protection
analysis.
168. See Schacter, supra note 31, at 313-17. While Schacter sees visibility as a response to "the
gay abstraction," she argues it is deployed by the anti-gay lobby. Id. at 313. Janet Halley shows how
liberals use this same abstraction to counter the thick description of homosexuality put forth by




ject gay men and lesbians-like other subordinated groups-to system-
atic exclusion and disadvantage at the hands of dominant groups.'6
An obvious reason to prohibit discrimination against a group then, would
be that such discrimination is widespread, unlike, say, discrimination
against fur-wearers and snail-eaters. 171 Surprisingly, though, ENDA ad-
vocates do not stress the existence of such systemic discrimination.
While some of those who testify on behalf of ENDA have told the
stories of individual victims of discrimination, 7' few have suggested that
widespread discrimination against homosexuals is prevalent."' Perhaps
this justification is not relied upon because to argue that the discrimina-
tion were widespread might undermine some of the other arguments in
favor of the legislation. If nondiscrimination were rational business pol-
icy, for example, the bill's proponents would have a difficult time ex-
plaining widespread irrationality. Moreover, the more widespread the
problem, the less conservative the bill becomes. Finally, opponents of the
bill often suggest that it would lead to extensive litigation."7 Relying on
data from states with state-wide antidiscrimination policies that include
protection based on sexual orientation, advocates insist that the bill
would do little to increase discrimination claims." They assume that
employers have policed themselves as a result of the law, rather than that
homosexuals might be less likely to bring such claims to avoid publicly
identifying their sexual orientation or that the legislation has been inef-
fective for other reasons. (Perhaps employees do not know that discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation is illegal in the jurisdiction in which
they work.) Moreover, it is not clear to me that the fact that ENDA is
likely to increase litigation in any significant way is a persuasive argu-
ment for those who would like to see an end to such discrimination; it
makes it sound as though the law is unlikely to be enforced.
The second option would require an altogether different strategy
with regard to ENDA. Rather than insisting that the legislation is unre-
markable, gay rights advocates would address the potentially radical im-
pact of the bill on the legal subjectivity of gay men and lesbians. This
position would recognize the extent to which gay men and lesbians suffer
169. See Schacter, supra note 31, at 298.
170. See Fajer, supra note 60, at 210.
171. See, e.g., ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118, at 79 (statement of Ernest Dillon); id at
83 (statement Todd M. Dobson); id. at 157 (statement of Nan Miguel) id. at 163 (statement of
Michael Proto).
172. For an example of the occasional testimony that does emphasize the extent to which such
discrimination is significant, see id at 86 (statement of Michael T. Duffy, Chair Commissioner of
the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination).
173. See, e.g., ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118 (statement of Robert H. Knight, Daniel S.
Garcia, Paul T. Mero) (not included in CIS microfiche compilation of the hearing; available at
<http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp>) ("[ENDA] will entangle businesses [in] all types of
expensive litigation."); 142 CONG. REc. S9989 (daly ed. Sept. 6, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kassebaum).
174. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S9995 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kerrey).
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discrimination, and the ways in which the legal system is both directly
and indirectly implicated in that oppression.
Janet Halley contrasts the thin description of homosexuality prof-
fered by the Evans majority with the thick description set forth by the
Hardwick majority. She notes, "[t]he claim that 'sodomy' is 'the behav-
ior that defines the class' implies a thick description of the sexual orien-
tation categories, and has precipitated a series of legal struggles to con-
trol their description and thus the legal understanding of the real people
inhabiting them." '175 While "Hardwick frankly acknowledge[s] its textual
character by inviting its audience to become engaged in reading it,"'76 the
Evans majority suppresses "this intense, and tense, relationship between
the text and its readers. It invites us to forget ourselves in a way that
Hardwick does not."'" It could be said that ENDA advocates follow the
same course as the Evans majority by refusing to confront the very issues
that guide the debate about whether sexual orientation should be a pro-
tected classification. Two of these issues described by Halley are sex and
hate.' Chai Feldblum, in criticism of her own testimony on behalf of
ENDA, contends that gay rights advocates have also failed to take on the
issue of morality.' 9
Gay rights advocates should seize the opportunity through public
debate, whether surrounding ENDA or local law reform projects, to
counter the thick description of homosexuality equating it with sodomy
and thus moral reprehensibility that conservatives have successfully
propagated. A similar attempt at equating heterosexual sodomy and im-
morality would be laughable, because the majority of the population
would identify with the acts being condemned; they would be engaged in
the text in a way that they are not in the Evans majority or in the defenses
of ENDA.
Holmes's definition of a special right'80 provides a firm basis for
granting special rights-when special facts are true of one group that are
not true of others. Gay rights advocates, then, need to be willing to talk
about the facts. What are the special facts of each group-businesses,
government, homosexuals, maybe heterosexuals-and what legal conse-
quences should attach to them? To this end, it seems worth arguing that
the class of homosexuals, if not created, is maintained by the state, di-
rectly through sodomy laws 8' and marriage laws, to take the most obvi-
175. Halley, supra note 10, at 439 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996)).
176. Id. at434.
177. Id. at 435.
178. See id. at 434-37.
179. See Feldblum, supra note 129, at 299-304.
180. See supra text accompanying note 3.
181. See Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLuM. L. REv. 1431, 1469-70
(1992); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-94 (1986). For an argument that the
government's refusal to prohibit discrimination against gay teachers amounts to a condonation of
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ous examples, and indirectly by failing to protect gays against employ-
ment, housing, and other types of discrimination.
Violence against lesbians and gay men has been well documented.
Studies have shown that gays are among the most frequently targeted
groups for hate crimes. ' One study has found that "slightly more than
half of socially active lesbians and gay men.., experience some form of
anti-gay/lesbian violence." '183 Moreover, 89 percent of gay and lesbian
respondents have reported being the victims of verbal harassment." Gay
men and lesbians also suffer discrimination in the workplace, in terms of
wages,"u working conditions and type of employment." To its credit, the
Human Rights Campaign has begun a project to document employment
discrimination against gay men and lesbians, with the plan of "ex-
pand[ing] our program to uncover more specific examples and to better
communicate these stories to lawmakers and their staffs, as well as to the
American public through the media."'87
violence against gay students, see Anthony E. Varona, Setting the Record Straight: The Effects of the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1997 on the First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights of Gay
and Lesbian Public School Teachers, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 25, 34 (1998) ("In fact, the
shortage of gay and lesbian role models in schools implicitly condones homophobic attitudes and
violence against those students who identify themselves, or are identified (whether accurately or
not), as lesbian or gay.").
182. See Varona, supra note 181, at 28 n.19 (citing HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE
AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 7 (Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Ben'ill eds., 1992) and U.S.
DEP'T OF JUST., FED'L BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HATE CRIME STATISTICS 1996 7 tbl.l (Jan. 8,
1998) (stating that 11.5 percent of the 8,759 bias-motivated incidents reported to the FBI in 1996
were targeted at individuals because of their sexual orientation)). Varona further reports that,
according to the Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations, 27 percent of 783
documented hate crimes in 1993 were aimed at gay men, replacing African Americans as the leading
target of those crimes. Varona, supra note 181, at 28 n.19 (citing Errol A. Cockfield, Jr., Crimes of
Bias, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1995, at B1).
183. GARY DAVID COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 37 (1991).
184. See id. at 141-44. Verbal harassment for the purposes of the study included threats of
violence, epithets, and insults aimed at homosexuals by heterosexuals on account of sexual
orientation. Id. at 141.
185. See M.V. Lee Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 48 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REV. 726, 728 (1995).
186. For a discussion of discrimination against gay and lesbian lawyers, see Jennifer Durkin,
Queer Studies P An Examination of the First Eleven Studies of Sexual Orientation Bias by the Legal
Profession, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 343 (1998); Executive Summary, The Los Angeles County Bar
Association Report on Sexual Orientation Bias, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 297 (1995).
For a discussion of discrimination based on sexual orientation in other employment contexts, see
Sharon G. Portwood, Employment Discrimination in the Public Sector Based on Sexual Orientation:
Conflicts Between Research Evidence and the Law, 19 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 113 (1995); Thomas
Weathers, Gay Civil Rights: Are Homosexuals Adequately Protected from Discrimination in
Housing and Employment?, 24 PAC. L.J. 541 (1993); Symposium, Developments in the Law - Sexual
Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1575 (1989) (stating that homosexuals face
discrimination in military employment, employment that requires security clearance, and civil
service employment).
187. Human Rights Campaign, Documenting Discrimination, (visited Dec. 22, 1998)
<http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplac/docdis/index.html>.
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Beyond laying out the facts about the lives of gay men and lesbians,
gay rights advocates should zero in on the extent to which legal rules
outside discrimination and criminal law affect gay men and lesbians.
Laws limiting marriage to different-sex couples serve as both a basis and
means for discrimination against gay men and lesbians. Regardless of
where one comes out on the same-sex marriage issue, the denial of the
right to marry to same-sex couples affects the opportunities for those
couples.'88 Although this conclusion might seem obvious, it significantly
undermines the special rights argument that gay rights grant homosexu-
als rights not guaranteed to heterosexuals. Justice Scalia makes such an
argument.
Recall Justice Scalia's discussion of the scope of Amendment 2:
"[I]t would prevent the State or any municipality from making death-
benefit payments to the 'life partner' of a homosexual when it does not
make payments to the long-time roommate of a nonhomosexual em-
ployee."'' 9 This particular example of the effect of the Amendment is at
first blush puzzling. Either Scalia is equating "life partners" with "long-
time [nonsexual] roommates," thereby suggesting that there is nothing
particularly special about same-sex sexual relationships. Or he is equat-
ing life partners of homosexuals and heterosexuals, only without using
the term for heterosexuals while putting it in quotations for homosexuals.
But equating the two immediately exposes a difficulty in the reasoning.
Similarly treating same-sex and different-sex long-term unmarried part-
ners would not, as Justice Scalia suggests, be neutral. The latter have the
option of receiving benefits through marriage, while the former do not.
The only way that straight and gay couples would be treated equally vis-
at-vis benefits attached to marital status would be if they both had the
legal option to marry. For Scalia, though, requiring that benefits be given
to same-sex partners would suggest special treatment. In that sense, mar-
riage is treated specially, and Scalia would have no problems with such
special treatment.
In fact, there is a certain irony in the fact that special rights has
come to be seen as negative in the context of gay rights. In several other
areas, including marriage, special rights are accepted in a matter-of-fact
way. It is common in legal discussions about marriage, for example, to
state that special rights are incurred from it. According to the American
Jurisprudence, for example, "[t]he terms 'service,' 'aid,' 'fellowship,'
'companionship,' 'cooperation,' and 'comfort' have also been employed
188. For a list of some of the benefits that come with marriage, see Martha M. Ertman,
Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, But Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1107, 1146 (1996). Making marriage increasingly lucrative, Congress has recently decided to
amend the existing legislation to relieve married couples of one of the few "penalties" that come
with marriage. See Jackie Calmes & Jeffrey Taylor, Tobacco Legislation Is Revived by Compromise
Attaching Amendment for Marriage Tax Cut, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1998, at A24.
189. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 638 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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in defining those mutual and special rights growing out of the marriage
covenant."'"
The term "special rights" is not necessarily derogatory. In fact, judi-
cial opinions of all stripes have, over the last 150 years, generally treated
special rights as rights that the state has chosen to confer upon individu-
als, groups or itself. The assumption is that those rights are to be enjoyed,
without apology. Not only is the Constitution seen to have granted spe-
cial rights to citizens,'9 ' other laws are seen to have accorded special
rights to corporations," railroads, stockholders," property owners,'9"
and parties to treaties" to name a few. Of course, there are often com-
peting special rights claims, but my point is that the term is often de-
ployed in a benign way.
190. 41 AM. JUR. 2D Husbands & Wives § 7 (1995); see also Lewis v. Storer Communications,
642 F. Supp. 168, 170 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (explaining that liability to a husband's spouse in a suit
against a broadcasting company for loss of consortium "is strictly deriv[ed] from the right of the
spouse to recover") (citing Smith v. Tri-State Culver Mfg. Co., Inc., 191 S.E.2d 92 (Ga. Ct. App.
1972)).
191. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-80 (1872) (outlining some of the
special rights of citizenship). Ironically, the first use of the term "special rights" in federal court was
in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). There, Chief Justice Taney considered
special rights to be positive, and only to belong to certain individuals. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
at 412. In particular, blacks did not possess these rights. The court justified this denial of special
rights by looking to the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution: "It is obvious that [blacks]
were not even in the minds of the framers of the Constitution when they were conferring special
rights and privileges upon the citizens of a State in every other part of the Union." Id. at 411-12. If
this quotation conveys the meaning of special rights, then special rights are precisely what blacks
were (and are) seeking. Understood in this way, when some individuals are denied the privileges, or
special rights of citizenship, guaranteeing them those same rights is guaranteeing special rights. In
this sense, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments (among others) can be seen as having given
blacks (and others) the special rights that most individuals in the country already enjoy.
192. See, e.g., County of Tipton v. Locomotive Works, 103 U.S. 523, 527 (1880) ("[Tlhe
authority of the legislature to create corporations with special rights and privileges, existed as an
incident of sovereignty .... ).
193. See, e.g., Lucking v. Detroit & C. Navigation Co., 273 F. 577, 582 (E.D. Mich. 1921) ("A
railroad company is clothed by the state with special rights, franchises, and privileges, including
certain attributes of sovereignty itself ....").
194. See, e.g., Johnson v. Fuller, 121 F.2d 618, 625 (3d Cir. 1941) (referring to Pennsylvania
corporate law and stating "that a business corporation may amend its charter ...to increase or
diminish its authorized capital stock, or to reclassify the same, by changing the number, par value,
designations, preferences, or relative, participating, optional or other special rights of the shares").
195. See, e.g., Schwab v. Smuggler-Union Mining Co., 174 F. 305, 310 (8th Cir. 1909) ("It is
hardly necessary to state that any private riparian proprietor upon a stream may obtain, as against
other proprietors, special rights to use the water in the nature of easements or servitudes farther and
greater than those conferred upon him simply as a riparian proprietor.").
196. See, e.g., Robertson v. General Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495, 501 (4th Cir. 1929) ("The Attorney
General said: 'The treaty under consideration is a reciprocal one: each party to it covenants to grant
in the future to the subjects and citizens of the other parties certain special rights in consideration of
the granting of like special rights to its subjects or citizens."') (quoting 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 278
(1889)).
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V. CONCLUSION
This article has intended not only to show that there is little actual
connection between the arguments of opponents and proponents of
ENDA, but also to suggest that ENDA advocates have, perhaps unwit-
tingly, based their arguments on a very liberal (read conservative) un-
derstanding of civil rights. Their arguments seem to take for granted that
affirmative action, quotas, or any "preferential treatment" are negative,
and that equal rights require identical treatment of all. I have argued
elsewhere that this position, particularly regarding race, is and has been
the mainstream position for some time. '97 And I am not the first to have
made such an argument.'98 If queer (critical) theory has taught us any-
thing, it seems that it has taught us that becoming as mainstream as pos-
sible is unlikely to lead to much change in the status quo.' 99 More im-
portantly, however, it seems that critical theory generally has taught us
that we cannot look at these struggles in a vacuum.' When we argue for
or against gay rights, we necessarily reflect certain understandings about
what we mean by rights, discrimination, equality and justice. And to the
extent that we suggest that affirmative action would lead to "special
treatment" and be inappropriate for a gay-rights bill, we implicate af-
firmative action as special. To the extent the term "special" has become
a trope for negative and inappropriate action generally, we reinforce that
meaning.
In fact, not one person testifying on behalf of ENDA has argued
that any rights considered "special" might ever be appropriate. Or that
equality might sometimes require different treatment. Historical uses of
special rights as well as arguments on behalf of affirmative action or
even for prohibiting pregnancy discrimination" 1 seem to have been for-
gotten.
197. See Engle, supra note 98, at 327-30.
198. See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 98-130 (1991);
Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-57 (1978) (criticizing the
shift from a "victim" to a "perpetrator" perspective in Supreme Court jurisprudence and arguing for
a victim perspective that attends to societal and economic subordination); Gary Pellet, Race
Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 802-08 (1990) (describing the Civil Rights-era struggle
between Black Nationalism and integrationism and how the latter became the dominant paradigm).
199. See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Skepticism, Culture and the Gay Civil Rights Debate in a Post-
Civil Rights Era, 110 HARV. L. REv. 684 (1997) (reviewing ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY
NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY (1995); URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY:
THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY AND LESBIAN LIBERATION (1995)).
200. See generally AFTER IDENTITY: A READER IN LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 51.
201. For discussions of the special treatment/equal treatment debate around pregnancy, see
Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace
Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1142-63 (1986); Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle:
Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE
325 (1984-1985).
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The question gay rights advocates should address is not whether
they are advocating for equal rights or special rights, but why gay men
and lesbians need special rights. Even in the absence of antigay initia-
tives, the state makes homosexuals strangers to the laws. Because of
these facts, homosexuals are in need of special rights. It's about time we
admit it.

